This article provides an in-depth analysis of China’s foreign policy in 2023, exploring four dimensions: global security, China-United States relations, China-Russia ties, and China’s «active» approach in the Global South.

2023 witnessed an attempt to depart from China’s historical «non-interference principle», marked by the conceptual redefinition of the «Global Security Initiative» and the country’s active involvement in dispute and conflict resolutions across the Global South. In the opening empirical section, the article examines China’s stance on global security, and its attempts to balance «activism» and non-interference. The following section investigates the complexity of China-United States relations, highlighting attempts at strategic dialogue amid persistent geopolitical struggles. Afterwards, the article argues that a recalibration of China-Russia ties is ongoing, emphasising China’s diplomatic discourse on non-allegiance and its less-ambiguous approach toward Ukraine. The last section discusses China’s style of activism in disputes and conflict theatres in the Global South, analysing the Russia-Ukraine war, the Iran-Saudi deal, and the Israel-Palestine war. The article concludes by highlighting the tension between China’s increasingly more active role in global security and the international system and the country’s attempts to preserve its historically crafted image as a «responsible» and «peaceful» great power.

Keywords – Foreign policy; global security; China-US; China-Russia; Global South.

1. Introduction

China’s foreign policy in 2023 can be characterised as one of unprecedented activism in global security, where the country took on a more engaged role as a global power and sought to redefine its position in global security governance. This development demonstrates an interest in updating and reformulating China’s position as a global security provider, challenging the longstanding dominance of the US as the sole global security actor since the post-World War II international system was established.

The subsequent section explores China’s longstanding policy of «non-interference», a principle that has shaped the country’s foreign relations since the Cold War [Chen 2014; Samarani 2017]. In 2023, China transformed its approach to non-interference, adopting a more proactive role in global security, particularly evidenced by the conceptual redefinition of its «Global Security Initiative» (GSI) [Fu 2022, 6 September]. This transformation was also visible in China’s actions in relation to disputes and conflicts around the world. Beijing’s efforts to reconcile this more proactive stance with its traditional policy of non-interference reflected longstanding debates among scholars in China, which have recently become more prominent in diplomatic discussions and decisions in foreign policymaking. The article explores this trend by focusing on three recipients of the country’s foreign policy – namely the US, Russia and countries in the Global South – that is, the three priorities of Chinese foreign policy.

The following two sections thus focus on China’s relations with the US and Russia. Section 3 discusses China-US relations, noting that despite efforts to promote dialogue, tensions persist, particularly concerning Taiwan’s sovereignty. Section 4 examines China-Russia ties in 2023, highlighting a recalibration in China’s discourse on its relationship with Moscow, particularly regarding the Russia-Ukraine war. While bilateral cooperation continues, mostly focusing on common security concerns and strengthening economic ties, China attempts to show a (discursive) departure from a total alignment with Russia.

The final section discusses China’s activism in Global South security. China’s involvement in foreign disputes and conflicts in 2023 is here analysed, revealing a strategic stance that emphasises political settlements while attempting to safeguard the country’s non-interference principle. This approach eventually aims to reinforce China’s image as a responsible power [Foot 2001].

Regarding data sources, this article relies on official documents, media articles, reports, speeches, and statements by political figures in English, Chinese, and Russian, as well as secondary literature. The author acknowledges potential biases in the analysed data, particularly from Chinese and Russian sources, but emphasises the importance of critically examining these sources for a deeper understanding of China’s contemporary foreign policy and for efforts to de-Westernise and de-hierarchise the discipline of International Relations.

2. China’s Foreign Policy in the Wake of Renegotiated Non-Interference

In 1955, then-Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai first advocated for what later became universally known as China’s «non-interference» – a policy suggesting the country’s commitment to abstain from meddling in the domestic affairs of other states under the tacit accord of reciprocity [Sørensen 2019]. Over the years, this principle has become a hallmark of China’s foreign relations, akin to its «non-conditionality» rule [Alden and Hughes 2009], which excludes democratisation goals from loans and aid deals. While the practical application of non-interference may appear ambiguous, it remains the ideological cornerstone connecting China with many Global South countries, with the appeal of China’s non-interference to its foreign partners, especially to non-democratic regimes, lying in the belief that Beijing would refrain from intervening in, e.g., how states handle domestic protests, phrase their labour laws, or distribute wealth. However, changing China’s traditional stance on global security in 2023 – an area where non-interference is particularly challenging to uphold – may have put this «ideological bond» at risk.

Extensive literature has already been published concerning China’s previous attempts to renegotiate the country’s approach to non-interference [e.g., Chaziza and Goldman 2014; Gonzales-Vicente 2016; Zheng 2016; Hirono et al. 2019; Sørensen 2019]. Among these studies, a notable renegotiation occurred with China’s participation in peacekeeping operations, where the country managed to preserve a semblance of non-interference by ensuring that legitimate national governments would consent to external intervention and peacekeepers would operate under the United Nations (UN) framework [Pang 2005]. Consent from target countries and UN-led operations (instead of Chinese-led) «protected» the country’s claims to operate under non-interference.

On 21 February 2023, however, with China introducing a concept paper outlining the characteristics of its newly established GSI [MFA PRC 2023c], the country showed the willingness to depart from its historical «inaction» in the face of foreign disputes and conflicts and embrace a more proactive role. Indeed, this approach to global security witnessed China abandoning the shield of the UN and presenting itself as a «free agent» in global security. Despite such change, China has strategically sought to maintain at least an appearance of its non-interference principle by framing its role not as that of a traditional mediator but more as a moderator or facilitator of dialogue [Seiwert 2023]. Indeed, official discourse generally depicted China as playing a secondary role in global security, with agency remaining in the hand of conflicting parties. Such a framing is thus set to reassure countries wary of China’s active approach to global security and preserve the authenticity of the country’s non-interference.

Documentary evidence published throughout the year further reiterates this trend, with particular emphasis on the concept paper on the GSI («The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper», Quanqiu Anquan Changyi Gainian Wenjian全球安全倡议概念文件) [MFA PRC 2023c], the «Law on Foreign Relations of the PRC» (Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Dui Wai Guanxi Fa 中华人民共和国对外关系法) adopted in June [MFA PRC 2023j], and the BRI white paper entitled «The Belt and Road Initiative: A Key Pillar of the Global Community of Shared Future» (Gongjian “Yi dai Yi lu”: Goujian Renlei Minyun Gongtongti de Zhongda Shixian 共建 “一带一路”：构建人类命运共同体的重大实践) released in October [State Council PRC 2023b].

Despite pertaining to different corpora, these documents underline the common principles that inform China’s behaviour. Notably, «inclusivity and mutuality» emphasise that China does not see itself as the sole actor in global security but advocates for a multipolar global security governance. For instance, the concept paper on the GSI states that «China stands ready to work with all countries and peoples […] to address all kinds of traditional and non-traditional security challenges» [MFA PRC 2023c]. In its efforts to moderate/facilitate dialogue, China sets its position on the sidelines and avoids favouring a conflicting party over the other. Moreover, the three documents commit to peacekeeping, reinforcing a change in non-interference that historically ensured China’s success. Article 16 of the Law on Foreign Relations, for instance, emphasises that the country «observes the basic principles of peacekeeping operations and maintains a position of fairness» [MFA PRC 2023j]. The other two documents make similar arguments, stressing the crucial role of «joint consultation and contribution» to global security [State Council PRC 2023b] and the aim to «eliminate the root causes of international conflict» [MFA PRC 2023c].

2023 has made apparent China’s intention to re-negotiate its non-interference principle more openly, and potentially set the stage for the country’s role as a global security provider, thus redefining its position on the global stage.

3. China-United States in the Wake of Newfound Strategic Dialogue

Among other historical anniversaries, 2022 marked the fiftieth anniversary of Richard Nixon’s 1972 historic visit to Beijing, a pivotal moment that shifted China-US relations during the Cold War era [e.g., Samarani 2017]. However, 2022 did not replicate the iconic rapprochement seen fifty years earlier. Instead, the relationship between the two great powers persisted in competition, emphasising the hegemonic struggle versus a rising power dynamic, with Taiwan’s sovereignty as a central point of contention. Nonetheless, a fragment of the 1972 legacy of US-China relations seems to have resurfaced in 2023, particularly from a dialogic perspective. Both sides have attempted to establish a new framework for interaction, aiming to transform open antagonism into dialogue. However, despite 2023 being a phase of renewed communication between the two great powers, this dialogue remains imperfect. It is crucial not to mistake it for lack of competition or «future struggle» (douzheng 斗争), a term highlighted in Secretary General Xi Jinping’s October 2022 Work Report to the 20th Communist Party Congress [State Council PRC 2022].

Such a process unfolded in early 2023, marked by what is now identified as the notorious «Chinese balloon incident». This incident involved a high-altitude balloon crossing North American airspace – Alaska, Western Canada, and contiguous US territories – before being shot down by the US Air Force on 4 February near the coast of North Carolina. International observers foresaw strained China-US relations due to this incident [Culver 2023, 22 February; Kennedy 2023]. It amplified significant US concerns over China’s technological capabilities, triggering memories akin to 9/11 in the US public, as it was the first time such an incident directly affected US soil. The diplomatic standoff from this incident led to the suspension of preparations for US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s anticipated visit to China in April [Miller et al. 2023, 5 February]. Chinese authorities have been hesitant to resume preparations for the visit. Some have attributed this behaviour to concerns about the potential publication of analyses on the balloon’s debris [Sevastopulo 2023, 14 April]. Despite this tense start, China-US relations in 2023 concluded on a more positive note for the two countries. While lacking groundbreaking announcements, Xi Jinping’s visit to the US and meeting with President Joe Biden in San Francisco signalled a mutual agreement to resume high-level dialogue and communication between the two powers.

The transition from the «balloon crisis mode» to high-level meetings involved a series of lower-level engagements. These meetings relied on established channels of the bilateral relationship, ensuring ongoing communication even during critical moments. Like the China-US rapprochement in the 1970s, where diplomatic talks stemmed from sports and academic cooperation, in 2023 the focus shifted to climate concerns. US Special Climate Envoy John Kerry’s three-day visit to China in July marked one of three high-level visits by current US administration officials since the pandemic travel restrictions had been eased [US DoS 2023b]. Preceded by Blinken’s June visit and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s visit ten days earlier, Kerry’s discussions centred on economic and climate issues [US DoS 2023a; Capoot 2023, 9 July]. This signalled both nations’ willingness to reopen dialogue, particularly in areas crucial for domestic stability and international positioning, such as economic cooperation and shared concerns about climate issues. Following her visit, Yellen stressed the commitment to prevent the US and China from supporting «unintended escalatory actions that could harm our overall economic relationship» [Capoot 2023, 9 July].

Despite both major powers signalling a readiness to redefine their diplomatic relationship, contrasting views on China prevailed in the US political discourse, marking a persistent portrayal of Beijing as an antagonist, if not an outright enemy. Throughout the year, discussions centred on the profound ideological differences between China and the US, dominating top-level political discourse. Notably, Biden’s characterisation of Xi as a «dictator» during a presidential campaign fundraiser in June 2023 reflects ongoing ambiguities in portraying China as an adversary – a narrative seemingly important for the current president’s potential in the 2024 elections.1 Similarly, the unexpected replacement of Chinese Foreign Ministry Qin Gang in July fuelled debates about China’s perceived threat [AP News 2023, 25 July].

However, some influential voices in US politics have begun re-evaluating China’s threat level. CIA Director William Burns, amidst the balloon crisis, questioned China’s potential military invasion of Taiwan, interpreting the alleged 2027 timeframe as more of an indicator than an already-made decision [Volz 2023, 26 February].2 Additionally, Yellen’s speech at John Hopkins University in April suggested a shift in the US approach, scaling down the intent to economically decouple China [US DoT 2023].3

Maintaining dialogue and open communication has remained pivotal in the China-US relationship throughout the last ten months of 2023. Despite Henry Kissinger’s July visit to Beijing not resulting in a new Shanghai Communiqué4 [AP News 2023, 20 July], and his passing in December [MFA PRC 2023n], the US and China invested significant political capital in regularly and openly exchanging information. They aimed to prevent a complete interruption of communication akin to a Cold War scenario, once considered unimaginable. Although US political discourse on China still involves conflicting arguments, both nations’ diplomatic efforts appear aimed at following a path of potential dialogue. However, the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty remains a highly contentious aspect that may as well hinder this pursuit.

4. China-Russia in the Wake of «Recalibrated» Relations

China-Russia relations have often been understood as a deepening convergence, bordering alliance. This trend directly responds to the escalating systemic confrontation between China and the US, prompting Beijing to actively seek «allies» in contesting the liberal international order [e.g., Kaczmarski 2015, Korolev 2019, Bossuyt & Kaczmarski 2021, Bērziņa-Čerenkova 2022, Kirchberger et al. 2022]. The initial ambivalence in China’s stance toward Russia’s aggression of Ukraine further fuelled this perception [Huang 2023, 8 July]. Despite the developments in 2023 not completely clarifying China’s position toward Moscow, Chinese official discourse depicted a less ambiguous approach, emphasising attempts to offer a more balanced perspective on the Russia-Ukraine war. China showcased a resurgence in diplomatic efforts toward Ukraine, directly – through high-level meetings – and indirectly – via economic and financial support. This shift, coupled with altered rhetoric from China’s top diplomats, aimed to reposition China in the eyes of the international community.

It is crucial to note that this repositioning does not signify a distancing from Russia. In fact, the two nations have maintained a tight schedule of diplomatic engagements throughout the year. President Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin engaged in state visits to each other’s countries. Xi visited Moscow in March, and Putin attended the third «Belt & Road Forum» in Beijing in October [President of Russia 2023a; President of Russia 2023b]. However, there were subtle changes from previous years, such as Xi’s in-person absence from the «Eurasian Economic Forum» in Moscow [Xinhua, 25 May] and the divergence in reciprocal visits between the two countries’ heads of government.5

Examining China-Russia relations in 2023 through diplomatic discourse reveals three prominent themes. First, there appear to be minor frictions in the bilateral relationship, with China seeking to reposition itself and Moscow emphasising the uniqueness of bilateral ties. This is illustrated, for instance, in statements by China’s former Foreign Affairs Minister Qin Gang and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. According to Russian News Agency TASS, Qin, newly appointed, stated during a telephone conversation with Lavrov in late January that «Chinese-Russian relations are based on the principles of non-allegiance […] and non-confrontation, while not targeting any third party»[TASS 2023, 9 January]. Notably, the TASS transcript specifies that «non-allegiance» should be interpreted in terms of systemic bloc confrontations, and not in terms of changes in the nature of the bilateral relationship between Beijing and Moscow.6 Such a specification, however, is absent in the Chinese transcript [MFA PRC 2023a]. A few months later, while meeting Qin in person in Uzbekistan at the outskirts of the «Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation», Lavrov was quoted defining China-Russia ties as characterised by «robust resilience» and the frequency of bilateral meetings by the «need to synchronize […] positions» [TASS 2023, 13 April, emphasis added].

The second theme involves the war in Ukraine and China’s resumed diplomatic dialogue with Kyiv. Throughout 2023, China seemingly attempted to construct a more open position toward Ukraine, with, among other things, then-head of the CPC’s diplomacy Wang Yi meeting up with Ukraine Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba during the «Munich Security Conference» in February [MFA PRC 2023b]. There was also the appointment of a new Ukrainian ambassador to Beijing in June (a position that had remained vacant since 2021) following a phone conversation between Xi and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in April [MFA PRC 2023g]. Perhaps most importantly, a Ukrainian government member, Ukraine’s deputy Economy Minister Taras Kachka, visited China in July for the first high-level visit since the war [Quin Pollard 2023, 20 July]. According to Xinhua, Lavrov «applauded China’s position paper for accommodating the security concerns of all parties and being conducive to eliminating the root causes of the conflict» during a conversation with Wang in Moscow [Xinhua, 19 September] – a sentiment shared by Putin shortly afterwards [MFA PRC 2023k]. Russia’s somewhat formal support of China’s position paper on Ukraine had been facilitated by Wang’s words a month earlier. By stating that «on any international and multilateral occasion […] China would uphold an independent and impartial position» [State Council PRC 2023a], the Chinese Foreign Minister signalled the importance for China to show a different facet to the international community even at the expense of upholding a less ambiguous stance over Ukraine.

A corollary to the construction of Ukraine in China’s diplomatic discourse is represented by Beijing’s stance on nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. China not only offered direct financial support to Ukraine to maintain nuclear energy facilities properly working through a donation to the «International Atomic Energy Agency» [CGTN, 6 March], but, through China’s UN Ambassador Geng Shuang, the country also repeatedly invited Russia and Ukraine to «stay away from the nuclear redline» [Guancha 2023, 24 June].

Lastly, a final theme shows China-Russia ties at their most positive in 2023. Emphasis is placed on cooperation and international dialogue toward Afghanistan, a security issue China and Russia share. Indeed, the two countries have made efforts to keep Kabul under observation, especially since the Taliban takeover in 2021, including sponsoring multilateral meetings with countries neighbouring Afghanistan such as Iran and Pakistan [MFA PRC 2023f].

In conclusion, China’s diplomatic discourse shows both recalibration in the approach towards its bilateral relationship with Russia and Beijing’s efforts to reposition itself in response to the Russia-Ukraine war.

5. China’s Foreign Policy in the Wake of «Activism» in the Global South

As noted in the previous sections, the most notable change in China’s foreign policy during 2023 has been its increasingly active approach to foreign disputes and conflicts. As China was emerging as a significant global power, the boundaries of its once unwavering non-interference stance have been put under more pressing negotiation. The concept had remained under discussion in China’s academic circles for years, with some arguing for the need to reassess non-interference considering the changing global context, suggesting the country’s greater engagement with international affairs. Others, in contrast, had warned that any renegotiation of non-interference may raise questions about China’s sovereignty and invite external interventions in the country’s own internal affairs [Zheng 2016]. At the same time, China has strived to reconcile its role as a «responsible great power» with the concept of its «peaceful rise».7 This has led to a cautious approach, steering clear of potential foreign disputes and conflicts that could force the country to assume a clear position in favour of or against disputing countries.

This cautious stance was also particularly evident in China’s voting behaviour in the UN Security Council, with frequent abstentions in controversial votes involving countries in the Global South [Chan 2013]. However, in what has been perceived as a «novelty», reports of China’s diplomatic intervention in conflict theatres – actual or hypothetical – became prominent in international media and a real expectation among analysts and policymakers alike. The perception of a Chinese «shift» was further complemented by the release of several new diplomatic position papers which, detailing China’s approach to ongoing crises worldwide, were indicative of a more attentive role on the international stage. Above all, in 2023, three specific cases underscored China’s newfound role as a potential agent in mediating foreign conflicts and disputes. These included the publication of «China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis» (Guanyu Zhengzhi Jiejue Wukelan Weiji de Zhongguo Lichang关于政治解决乌克兰危机的中国立场) in February 2023 [MFA PRC 2023d], the «Joint Trilateral Statement by the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic Republic of Iran» (Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo, Shate Alabo Wangguo, Yilang Yisilan Gongheguo San Fang Lianhe Shengming 中华人民共和国、沙特阿拉伯王国、伊朗伊斯兰共和国三方联合声明) in March 2023 [MFA PRC 2023e], and the «Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on Resolving the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict» (Zhongguo Guanyu Jiejue BaYi Chongtu de Lichang Wenjian 中国关于解决巴以冲突的立场文件) in November 2023 [MFA PRC 2023m]. Analysing these documents provides insight into how China envisions its role as a «responsible» and «peaceful» great power while operating within a de facto non-interference self-imposed mandate.

A clear distinction emerges regarding the nature of the foreign crises under scrutiny, especially concerning the frames through which China’s «solutions» are presented. Notably, the cases of Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine are treated similarly in China’s position papers, emphasising the need for a «political settlement» mediated by the UN, with the will of the conflict-afflicted population as the main driver of any solution. This approach allows China to influence conflict resolutions while deflecting responsibility to other supranational actors (i.e., the UN) and giving agency to the conflicting states, thereby safeguarding its non-interference principle.

The proposed solution for the Iran-Saudi case follows a similar pattern, endorsing Saudi Arabia and Iran’s negotiation roles while downplaying the roles of mediators such as China, Iraq, and Oman. Indeed, in the Joint Trilateral Statement, active agency remains exclusively ascribed to Tehran and Riyad. Significantly, in the Trilateral Statement, the Saudi and Iranian sides not only expressed their appreciation and gratitude to the Republic of Iraq and the Sultanate of Oman for hosting rounds of dialogue that took place between both sides during the years 2021-2022. They also made manifest their appreciation and gratitude to the leadership and government of the People’s Republic of China for hosting and sponsoring the talks, and the efforts it placed towards its success [MFA PRC 2023e].

In all the above cases, the emphasis is on a «political solution», which places conflicting actors at the forefront, protecting China’s hands-off interventionist approach. This consistent stance aligns with Beijing’s self-narrative as a rising power, distinct from US norms and practices, particularly appealing in regions like the Middle East with a history of instability linked to US direct military operations.

Another significant aspect emerging from these documents is the emphasis on humanitarian assistance and the protection of afflicted populations, reinforcing China’s image as a responsible global power prioritising civil society’s well-being over global power struggles. For instance, in the Israel-Palestine document, Beijing invites all parties to «refrain from depriving the civilian population in Gaza of supplies and services indispensable to their survival, set up humanitarian corridors in Gaza to enable rapid, safe, unhindered and sustainable humanitarian access, and avoid a humanitarian disaster of even greater gravity» [MFA PRC 2023m].

In addition to positioning itself against a more hands-on US, this approach ensures that China’s «political solutions» remain uncontested, allowing the country to establish itself as a viable «moderator/facilitator of dialogue» across the Global South. The only exception seems to be the Israel-Palestine conflict, where Chinese diplomats’ discourse, despite maintaining a similar approach in the Israel-Palestine position paper as with Russia-Ukraine, have assumed more assertive tones, particularly highlighting brutalities against the Palestinian population – a stance that can be partially explained by the historical ties shared by China and Palestine [e.g. Marzano 2022]. For example, during a telephone conversation with the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, Wang was reported saying that: «Israel’s actions have gone beyond the scope of self-defence, and Israel should heed the call of the international community and the Secretary-General of the United Nations and stop its group punishment to the people in Gaza» [MFA PRC 2023l].

In 2023, China’s foreign policy appeared to have deviated from its traditional non-interference principle, embracing a more interventionist role in foreign disputes and conflicts. Notably consistent across diverse core cases, China’s approach reinforced its self-proclaimed image as a responsible global actor by focusing on humanitarian assistance.

6. Conclusions

In his seminal volume On China, Henry Kissinger quoted the advice of a famous Qing-era Confucian scholar on engaging with foreigners: «Your manners and deportment should not be too lofty, and you should have a vague, casual appearance. Let their insults, deceitfulness, and contempt for everything appear to be understood by you and yet seem not understood, for you should look somewhat stupid» [2011, digital edition]. Such an anecdote has offered a good analogy for the ambiguity that has characterised China’s foreign policy and its practice of never fully showing its hand in the past. However, the evolution of the country’s approach to international affairs in 2023 may as well have made this comparison obsolete.

This article has offered some considerations on China’s foreign policy in the past year, focusing on the country’s activism, especially in the realm of global security. Such considerations are a contribution to studies attempting to understand the extent to which China is nowadays renegotiating its traditional principle of non-interference by being more active in mediating foreign disputes and conflicts. However, the article also takes stock of the country’s attempts to maintain a «pretence of non-interference», thus upholding «activism with Chinese characteristics».

When examining China-US ties, both sides’ attempts to transform antagonistic competition into dialogue have emerged from the analysis, particularly exemplified by Xi’s state visit to the US in November 2023. However, the «Chinese Balloon Incident», first, and the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty, second, have underscored the fragility of a dialogue characterised by geopolitical struggle and conflicting narratives. Moreover, the analysis of China-Russia ties has revealed Beijing’s discursive attempts to recalibrate the bilateral relationship with Moscow in response to global security issues, especially Ukraine. While maintaining frequent diplomatic exchanges, China’s discourse on Russia departed from a static to a dynamic alignment, showing the extent of Beijing’s strategic adaptability. The most notable change, however, remains linked to China’s more interventionist role in the Global South, where the country has assumed a new position as a moderator/facilitator of dialogue with a keen eye on humanitarian assistance. The three specific cases – Russia-Ukraine, Iran-Saudi, and Israel-Palestine – highlighted China’s habit of framing solutions within the context of the UN to preserve a semblance of its non-interference rhetoric.

In 2023, China’s foreign policy has shown the country’s commitment to taking on a more proactive role in global security governance while also attempting to maintain its carefully crafted image of responsible global actor.

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