Austerity measures tied to disbursement of the bailout programme that Pakistan agreed upon with the International Monetary Fund in 2019 helped Islamabad progress towards macroeconomic stabilisation. After the COVID-19 outbreak hit the country in February 2020, related disruptions strained economic activity and put pressure on Pakistan’s fiscal position.

The Government of Prime Minister Imran Khan came under criticism for mishandling the health crisis. The intervention and the progressively prominent role played by the Army in coordinating the response to the pandemic resulted in a decline of the spread of the virus. It also showed that the military establishment had extended its control over aspects of the jurisdiction of civil power. Commentators defined Pakistan as a «hybrid martial law regime», while opposition parties joined forces against the Government over allegations of mismanagement and military interferences.

US-China rivalry and the post-9/11 security challenges that have impacted South Asia characterised Pakistan’s foreign policy. A priority for Pakistan is to continue benefitting from its relationships with Beijing and Washington, while containing the international pressure it is under to restrain alleged involvement with terrorism. The role played by Pakistan in the peace talks with the Taliban was welcomed by the USA. Tense relationships with India over Kashmir continued in 2020, while frictions arose with Saudi Arabia as Islamabad is diversifying its international partnerships.

Keywords – Army; austerity; COVID-19; economy; Pakistan Democratic Movement.

1. Introduction

Two years after the election that gave the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and its leader, Prime Minister Imran Khan, the mandate to govern Pakistan,1 many have questioned the appropriateness of their electoral choice. High expectations of the people of Pakistan were triggered by Mr. Khan’s electoral pledges under the slogan of a «new Pakistan»2. Yet, many of them were left unfulfilled.

The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2, henceforth «COVID-19») epidemic led to questioning the PTI Government’s capacity to address all the challenges that Pakistan faced. The country’s precarious economic situation was evident when the Economic Survey 2019-20 and the budget 2020-21 were presented in June 2020. A 0.4% GDP growth rate reduction was highlighted for fiscal year 2020 (1 July 2019 – 30 June 2020), together with the increased cost of living, unemployment and risen inflation.3

Crises affecting the ruling party PTI powerbase made public by the airing of internal fragmentations underlined that Imran Khan did not have control of the divided house. In parallel, a new alliance brought together opposition political parties united by the intention to oust Khan from power over accusations of mismanagement and alleged interferences by the military establishment.

The pandemic deteriorated Khan’s governance performance, who was blamed for the inefficient and indecisive response to the crisis. The military establishment showed the ability to control the emergency and filled the gap left by the Government.

Pakistan maintains its strategic relevance for Washington vis-à-vis the stabilisation of Afghanistan. This is due both, to the importance of its ports, land, and air routes for conducting USA operations in Afghanistan and for its influence on the Taliban forces. The US welcomed the role played by Pakistan in the talks and peace negotiations with the Taliban. It is of critical importance for Islamabad to continue benefitting from its ties with Washington while containing political and economic consequences of its alleged involvement with terrorism. Yet, in the period under analysis, Islamabad’s inclusion in the Financial Task Action Force’s (FATF)4 grey list of terrorism financing was confirmed.

Pakistan relies on its strategic alliance with China for military hardware. At the same time, the Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)5 is an unprecedented economic and development opportunity, with Beijing investing in Pakistan much more than the US.6 Despite the downward spiral in relationships between Washington and Beijing, the USA has not hindered China-Pakistan relationships. The two competing economic powers share common security interests: China strives for the stabilisation of Afghanistan for the sake of the Belt and Road Initiative’s success, while Kabul remains an important partner of the United States in the fight against terrorism.

Pakistan has voiced its discontent over New Delhi’s 2019 decision to revoke Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status and has tried to bring the issue to the attention of international fora and of its allies. Yet, the international community has not sided with Islamabad against India except for China, Turkey and Iran. Lack of support from Riyadh on the Kashmiri issue and Islamabad’s attitude towards exploring new partners was an irritant in Pakistan’s relationships with Saudi Arabia.

2. Tensions in the Government alliance

The latest Gallup survey published before the pandemic outbreak advised that only about one-third of the population was satisfied with the Government’s performance.7

The post-2018 election period was characterised by the capacity of Imran Khan to forge alliances, which allowed him to form the current Government.8 Contrasts appeared, both at federal and provincial levels, allegedly due to agreements reached with the allies that the PTI did not respect.9 In January 2020, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P) Minister for Information Technology and Telecommunications, Mr. Khalid Maqbool Siddiqui, announced his resignation from the federal Cabinet. Siddiqui explained that the PTI had not addressed his party’s demands as agreed upon before the elections and related to ensure completion of development projects in Sindh.10 Siddiqui resigned after PPP Chairperson Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari’s offer of ministries in Sindh to the MQM-P in exchange of the party’s withdrawal from the Government alliance.

The Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid Minister for Housing and Works, Mr. Tariq Cheema, protested against the unmet pre-electoral agreement reached with the PTI according to which his party would be given two ministries at the federal and Punjab government-level.11 Similarly, the Grand Democratic Alliance, the electoral alliance which is part of the federal Government and the provincial one in Sindh, voiced complaints. The GDA presented a 15-point charter of demands aimed to defend the interests of the Sindh province. One claim entailed the request to withdraw federal institutional jurisdiction on natural resources constitutionally owned by the provinces.12

The Baluchistan National Party led by former Chief Minister Akhtar Mengal was also discontented over alleged PTI’s negligence in ensuring law, order and respect of human rights in Balochistan and over its lack of commitment to developing the province.13

The internal divisions within the PTI led to the emergence of multiple hostile currents within the government, making it difficult for Imran Khan to give the impression of overall political unity within his party. PTI members of the National Assembly made accusations against Ali Zaidi, the Minister of Maritime Affairs, over his alleged involvement in corruption cases.14 A trust deficit among the ruling party’s leaders arose, and their discontent was aired publicly affecting the PTI’s cohesion.15 In an interview with «Voice of America»,16 federal Minister for Science and Technology Fawad Chaudhry made public the PTI Balkanisation and existing conspiracies among its members.17 The ruling party was also hit by a scandal in January 2020 when an inquiry was initiated for the sudden rise in prices of sugar and flour. Two committees, constituted by the office of the Prime Minister and the federal Ministry of Interior of Pakistan, issued reports18 which disclosed violations and irregularities done by sugar and wheat lobbies which availed of public subsidies. The documents referred to the involvement of Khan’s close cabinet aides in cartels formed to create a fake sugar and flour shortage crisis in Pakistan and to earn profits.19 Mr. Khan issued orders to make the reports public in the attempt to take distance from the scandal, yet, he had to acknowledge the involvement of political allies. Overall, the scandal undermined the PTI government’s anti-corruption narrative behind its «Naya Pakistan» manifesto and was an additional element of a disappointment for those who had hoped for a change triggered by the new Administration elected in 2018.

3. The pre-pandemic economic scenario

In July 2019, Pakistan entered into a US$ 6 billion-worth 39-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF) bailout agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).20 The EFF triggered fiscal positives, and until February 2020, Pakistan made significant progress towards macroeconomic stabilisation.21 In the first half of fiscal year 2020, the fiscal deficit stood at 2.3% of GDP, compared to 2.7% in the same period in 2019.22 The current account deficit dropped by 80%;23 a significant rise in foreign direct investment was recorded;24 the Karachi Stock Exchange reacted positively to the new economic scenario;25 and Moody’s Investor Service upgraded Pakistan’s economic outlook from negative to stable.26 The World Bank acknowledged the improvement in the «Ease of Doing Business Index» as Pakistan climbed the ranking from 136 to 108 in the scale indicating how close an economy is to the best global practices in business regulations.27 Development and social spending were reported to be accelerated, the current account deficit declined, and international reserves increased at a pace faster than anticipated.28

Some EFF spending targets were reported as being missed, like the ones related to health and education programmes and indicators associated with a reduction in circular debt, external debt, and tax collection.29 On this specific aspect, as of February 2020, the tax collecting authority had recorded an increase of tax returns for fiscal year 2019 (1 July 2018 – 30 June 2019) of over 45% as compared to the previous year. The tax collected in February 2020 was 17% more than in February 2019.30 Yet, only 31% of the targeted 1.7% of the GDP was reached, 31 and the IMF agreed to reduce the ambitious objective set in July 2019 – a 45% increase in the budget. Overall, the IMF review conducted in February 2020 reported progress made by Islamabad in advancing reforms and enhancing economic policies, which enabled disbursement of the US$ 450 million EFF tranche.32

Adjustments required by the IMF bailout programme dampened economic activity and contracted growth with noteworthy repercussions on the masses. Inflation was recorded at 14.6% in January 2020 up from 12.6% in December 2019, and prices of primary commodities rose. For example, in January 2020, the average retail price of wheat increased by about 10%; in one year, the price of vegetables hiked by 95%, gas increased by 55%, fuel by 25% and electricity by 14%.33 In response to the rising prices, the State Bank of Pakistan increased interest rates to 13.25%.34 Austerity measures triggered discontent and scepticism among the population on the effectiveness of the PTI Government’s economic policies and on its limited capacity to deliver on its electoral pledges.35

4. The PTI Government and the COVID-19 pandemic

Pakistan reported its first Coronavirus case on 26 February 2020. Confirmed cases of viral contagion grew after a religious congregation («Tablighi Jamaat»), attended by about 80.000 people, was held on 10 March 2020 at Raiwind Markaz, near Lahore.36 Shortly after, 20.000 people who had attended the congregation were quarantined, and over 60% of the contagions in Pakistan were found linked to people who had participated in the Raiwind gathering and pilgrims having a travel history in Iran.37 By 10 May 2020, Pakistan ranked as the 20th country in the world for the number of confirmed case (above 30.000), 27th for fatalities (648 deaths)38 and as one of the countries with the fastest rate of infections, according to the World Health Organization.39

Containment measures were imposed in Pakistan in response to the pandemic: international flight operations were interrupted and borders sealed;40 public gatherings were banned, except ones at mosques or congregational prayers;41 social distancing was advised; schools and universities and not essential businesses were closed.

In his first public speech since the outbreak of the pandemic in Pakistan, Mr. Khan rejected implementing an actual nationwide lockdown of the country because of the feared economic consequences given the incidence of the population living below the poverty line.42 Pakistan’s federal Government did not announce a clear strategy on how to handle the crisis, nor did it take a firm position on imposing a lockdown. Lack of aligned official statements by the Government aimed to inform the masses systematically and scientifically turned into an overall underestimation of the COVID-19 pandemic and its risks.43 As of June 2020, the registered COVID-19 cases in Pakistan were above 120.000 units.44 Imran Khan’s Government faced criticism for mishandling the COVID-19 crisis45 and for having had an alleged lackadaisical approach to it, which deprived the country of a clear sense of direction.

Provincial administrations decided to enforce individual lockdowns. They sought the Army’s intervention as per provisions of the 18th constitutional amendment,46 which gives a semi-autonomous administrative status to the provinces, and as per Article 245 of the Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan, according to which armed forces can be called to act in aid of civil power.47 On 24 March 2020, troops and the military’s medical resources were deployed in support of the local health infrastructures. Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan imposed restrictions,48 as did the territories of Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir.49 On 25 March 2020, the Capital Territory of Islamabad was also placed under lockdown.50

Mr. Khan continued to oppose the partial lockdown that the Army was deployed to enforce until 1 April 2020, when, after a meeting with the Chief of Army Staff, senior generals and cabinet ministers, it was announced that the military establishment would oversee the coordination of the national response to prevent the spread of COVID-19.51 An ad hoc joint civilian-military body – the National Command Operation Center (NCOC) – was established to synergise and articulate a unified national effort against COVID-19. The Center is composed of representatives of federal and provincial institutions and territories, coordinated by the Lt. General Hamood Uz Zaman Khan, and headed by the Minister for Planning, Development, Reforms and Special Initiatives, Mr. Asad Umar; its meetings are often attended by the Chief of Army Staff, General Qamar Bajwa.

The NCOC enforced selective («smart») lockdowns in COVID-19 hotspots in 30 cities to control the pandemic while minimising its economic impact. The military intelligence agencies led surveillance and contact tracing,52 deploying tracking systems and technologies originally used against terrorism.53 When the decision was made to lift the lockdown on 9 May 2020, Pakistan had a daily average of over 5.000 cases. By mid-June, the outbreak had hit nearly 7.000 new cases a day.

A seroprevalence survey conducted in July 2020 by the Health Services Academy and the World Health Organization reported higher seropositivity among adults than among children and elderly, with prevalence in urban areas. The infection rate was found to be higher among people below the age of 60 (81.4%), while more than 50% of casualties were concentrated among people aged 60 and above.54

By September 2020, the transmission had reduced drastically, and only about 300 cases were reported daily.55 According to the Health Services Academy study, 11% of Pakistanis had developed immunity for COVID-19 while between 60% and 70% of the population had applied basic hygienic practices recommended to prevent disease spread. Experts could not identify a specific reason for the decline, but testing, contact tracing and behavioural changes were acknowledged as being the measures slowing down the spread of the virus.56 Pakistan’s age distribution (two-thirds of Pakistan’s population is younger than 30) and robust immune systems spurred by regular immunisations were considered to be possible reasons for the trend.57 The decision to set up the NCOC coordinating provincial responses with military help and localised lockdowns were also considered significant game-changers.

After a notable downturn in cases since July, signs of a resurgence of COVID-19 indicated the onset of winter with a second wave of the outbreak from October 2020 raising fears of a spike in contagions across Pakistan.58 The Government planned to implement «micro-smart lockdowns» to buildings, streets, and other small localities with more than two positive cases.59

5. The economic consequences of the pandemic and the relief package

Global deterioration in the economic, disruption of local labour-intensive supply chains and downturn of financial conditions triggered by the pandemic outbreak affected Pakistan.60 The Government of Islamabad estimated that at least eight million people were affected by the shutdown in a country where the informal sector accounts for more than 70% of all jobs.61

The World Bank anticipated an economic slump in the region and a contraction of the real GDP growth for fiscal year 2020.62 The institution of Bretton Woods noted that Pakistan could fall into a recession and that the almost 1% GDP contraction – from 2.2% to 1.3% in fiscal year 2020 – would trigger a significant decline in per-capita income.63

Projections of the IMF anticipated a decline in the GDP growth rate for Pakistan that would reach 1.5% in 2020, with a rise in unemployment from 4.1% in 2019 to 4.5% in 2020, and a further rise to 5.1% in 2021.64 The IMF forecast a cut in imports from Pakistan in various countries as well as the reduction of remittances and tax collection.65 Data provided by the Washington-based institution indicated that inflation had increased to 11.8% from 6.8% of the previous fiscal year. Similarly, the current account deficit narrowed to 1% of GDP from 3.5% in 2019 due to a substantial 17.5% decline in imported goods.66 The State Bank of Pakistan recorded dwindled forex reserves to less than US$ 17 billion as of May 2020,67 while public debt rose from 87.5% of GDP in 2019 to 98.2% in 2020.68

The second 2020 quarterly report of the State Bank of Pakistan on the state of Pakistan’s economy69 acknowledged the challenges for the country and that the pandemic imposed revising the 4% GDP growth target for 2020 to 3%. The national central bank adopted measures, including a lowering of the interest rate from 12.5% to 11% (a week after the rate had been reduced from 13.25%), financing facilities and regulatory relief measures.70

In March 2020, the Ministry of Finance of Pakistan allocated US$ 151 million to the National Disaster Management Authority to purchase equipment to deal with the pandemic. About US$ 2 million was allocated to quarantines and US$ half million to the Directorate of Health Establishment. A meeting of the Cabinet chaired by Imran Khan at the end of March approved a US$12.2 billion economic relief package for businesses, small and medium enterprises and vulnerable people.71 Of this, about US$ one billion was allotted for low-income groups whose livelihood has been severely affected by the outbreak, while US$ 1.76 billion was assigned for wheat procurement. Loan interest payments for exporters were deferred temporarily, while a package of US$ 63 million was provided to support small industries and the agriculture sector. Additional subsidies entailed financial support to utility stores, for health and food supplies, and electricity bill payments relief.72 There was also a significant reduction in gasoline and diesel prices.

While reaffirming the commitment to the reform policies included in the current arrangement under the IMF EFF, on 26 March 2020 Pakistan sought almost US$ 4 billion additional financings from the IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. US$ 1.4 billion were granted by the IMF as part of a global US$ 50 billion emergency financing facility, the Fund’s Rapid Financing Instrument.73 The World Bank and the Asia Development Bank approved US$ 1 billion loan and US$ 1.5 billion in aid, respectively for Pakistan.

Of the total US$ 27.8 billion Pakistan’s external public debt maturing in the period 2020–2023, US$ 19 billion is due to the IMF, the World Bank, the Asia Development Bank and China. Imran Khan appealed globally to national and multilateral institutions to write off loans of the developing nations and called for debt relief as a means of support in the COVID-19 period. The G-20 (the forum of the largest economies of the world, which discuss financial and socioeconomic issues), the World Bank Group and the IMF suspended debt payments in 2020.74

6. The growing military role in the civil Administration

In 2018, Imran Khan became Prime Minister of Pakistan by winning the election overshadowed by the alleged assistance provided to him by the military establishment. Allegations of interference by the generals have intensified since then.75 In 2020, Mr. Khan needed to regain the confidence of the Army. Rumours were that the military establishment was dissatisfied with the Prime Minister’s performance across multiple issues and that he could be removed from office. However, no evidence showed that this would happen. Instead, the Army seemed to be inclined to let Mr. Khan continue his tenure while supervising him.

In August 2019, the term of the Chief of Army Staff of the Pakistan Army, General Qamar Bajawa, due to retire on the following November, was extended by Imran Khan by three years. The Government was not able to convince the Supreme Court of Pakistan as to why the extension was necessary and was granted a six-month-long one and suggested seeking the advice of the Parliament or appointing a new Chief of Army Staff. The military establishment was irritated by the PTI Government’s handling of the extension case. Later, in January 2020, the PTI succeeded in having legislation approved by the Parliament that gives the Prime Minister the power to extend the tenures of the higher offices of the armed forces. Yet, the relationship of the Executive and the military was reported to have deteriorated due to other ongoing frictions.76 Another element for disappointment for the military establishment was the inability of the PTI Government to remove Pakistan from the FATF grey list on terrorism financing. In 2018, the Paris-based FATF placed Pakistan on the «Improving Global Anti Money Laundering/Countering Financing of Terrorism Compliance» list. Being on the list makes it very difficult to obtain international financing and investment. Since then, Islamabad’s progress has been acknowledged in the implementation of the plan advised by the FATF, yet not enough to convince the international watchdog to upgrade Pakistan’s position. The FATF, after having acknowledged Pakistan’s progress in addressing anti-money laundering and terror, nonetheless, in October 2020, again announced the decision to keep Pakistan on its grey list until February 2021.77

The PTI civilian Government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic weakened Mr. Khan, amid a progressively more assertive role played by the military,78 which coincided with the flattening of the pandemic curve. The way the pandemic response was publicly communicated had an important role in showing the efficiency of the ongoing NCOC coordination. In May 2020, the military’s control in the management of COVID-19-related information and narrative was strengthened as retired General Asim Saleem Bajwa, former Director-General of the military’s media wing, the Inter-Services Public Relations, was appointed by the PTI Government as Special Assistant to Prime Minister on Information & Broadcasting.79

Concerns have been raised that Imran Khan’s Government has transferred most of its civilian Government’s powers to generals. According to analysts, interference by the military establishment has gone beyond matters of national security and foreign policy extending over aspects including finance, domestic affairs, and commerce.80 The military establishment controls strategic positions in Pakistan.81 General Asim Saleem Bajwa also holds the chairmanship of the CPEC Authority; the PTI Government appointed two military officers as Deputy Chairman and Executive Director of the Naya Pakistan Housing and Development Authority, the social welfare project aiming to provide five million housing units for disadvantaged Pakistanis; ex-military personnel serve as Chief Secretaries at the provincial government level; numerous ministers are linked to the military; and retired military officers hold positions in state-owned enterprises, including the Pakistan International Airlines.

7. The Pakistan Democratic Movement

In the period under analysis, the PTI was challenged by opposition parties.82 There have been several attempts in the last two years to bring together opposition groups on a common anti-government agenda,83 but they had failed mostly because of the diverging agendas of their two leading parties, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N).84

Mr. Khan’s focus on accountability and his pertinacity against the opposition using the judiciary system to fight corruption and cronyism has been perceived as having political aims. Political leaders who were jailed gained support from their judicial vicissitudes and were often freed. For example, Nawaz Sharif was allowed to travel to London for health-related reasons,85 and PPP former President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari was released on bail on medical grounds in an alleged money laundering case in December 2019.

On 20 September 2020, the leaders of four big opposition parties, the PML-N, the PPP, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), and the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party, and some smaller ones joined forces and announced the creation of a new, unitary organisation, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), under the leadership of Maulana Fazlur Rahman of the JUI-F.86 The anti-government PDM – which aims to polarise public discontent over Mr. Khan’s alleged misgovernment – issued a 26-point charter which spells out the goals of the movement, main ones being to end the military establishment’s interference in politics and to oust the Prime Minister.87 The PDM planned rallies and public meetings aimed at organising a long march to the Parliament in the capital city, Islamabad, in January 2021, to demand Khan’s resignation. The opposition leaders also announced that they would use votes of no confidence in Parliament to take down the Government.88 Speaking from London during a PDR rally held in Punjab in October 2020, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif accused Army Chief General Qamar Bajwa and Inter-Services Intelligence Chief Lt. General Faiz Hameed of subverting democratic institutions. This was a significant shift in the opposition’s focus on the security establishment, believed to be the actual power behind the Government of Imran Khan. Although the opposition has challenged the generals in the past, Sharif’s assertiveness against the Army was unprecedented.89

After having held rallies in Gujranwala, Karachi and Quetta, in November 2020 the PDM announced a 12-point charter, sharpening further the goals of the alliance. These include ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution, the independence of Parliament and the judiciary, distancing military and intelligence agencies from politics, implementing reforms for free and fair elections, freedom of expression and media, etc.90

The PDM is not the first alliance of opposition parties coalescing against rulers both, civilian and military ones, as similar experiences took place since the ‘60s.91 Overall, such coalitions in Pakistan were unable to achieve their ultimate targets over old rivalries and battles for political power. Yet, they provided noteworthy contributions to the democratic system.

The previous Charter of Democracy was signed in 200692 by the PML-N and the PPP. The two opposition parties led the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy93, bringing together political forces to restore the democratic process and oppose the rule of General Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan and Chief of Army Staff. The Charter of Democracy laid the foundations for subsequent political engagement, and its spirit provided the bulk of the content of the 18th constitutional amendment. In addition to the reforms introduced by the amendment of the Constitution aimed to reinforce parliamentary democracy, the Charter of Democracy included a pledge of opposition political forces to defend democracy despite partisan differences and never to support the military to overthrow an elected government.94 Violations of the Charter of Democracy started soon with power-sharing talks held by Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto, at that time leader in exile of the PPP, already in 2007. The Charter was also disregarded over rampant corruption, tax evasion and other such crimes by the political and business elite.

Past experiences show that inhomogeneities and rivalries, varying agendas of the member parties of alliances have led such movements to fail to achieve their goals. Signals of lack of cohesion within the PDM have been already shown. Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari distanced himself and the PPP from Sharif’s tirade about the military establishment at rallies.95 Similarly, the PDM has not reached a consensus on how to address the grievances of ethnic groups in the country.96 Unlike the past, now the ruling Government benefits from the support of the Army; hence today PDM’s action can gather traction and public support by opposing both, civilian and military establishments. While time will advise on the unity of PDM, the achievement of its primary goal to ousting the ruling PTI Administration seems to be inevitably linked to the capacity of the latter to keep enjoying the support of the military establishment. At the same time, any attempt of the opposition to ousting Khan by negotiating with the generals will involve them further in politics, invalidating the purpose of the PDM and further weakening the democratic process in Pakistan.97

8. Relationships between Pakistan and the USA and the Afghan backdrop

In September 2020, the Congress of the United States of America issued a report titled «Military and Security Developments in China»98 suggesting that Beijing has plans to enhance engagement with Pakistan to build military installations. The report also notes that China’s CPEC entails pipelines and port construction having the main aim to «decrease China’s reliance on transporting energy resources through strategic chokepoints, such as the Strait of Malacca».99

A peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan is a key element to the stability of the region, which is essential to the development of the CPEC and of paramount importance in the context of Washington’s plans for military withdrawal from the country.100

Despite US diplomacy’s voiced concerns over the BRI and the CPEC,101 Beijing’s assertiveness in South Asia and its impact on regional stability102 prevented China-USA tensions from affecting bilateral relationships between Washington and Islamabad notwithstanding strong ties between Pakistan with China over economic and security interests.103

Washington has attributed much of the Afghan insurgent’s longevity to Pakistani support. Just at the beginning of 2018, President Trump blamed Pakistan for «taking money and doing nothing»104 in countering terror and cut off security assistance. In contrast, 2020 was a smooth period in the USA-Pakistan relationship amid cooperation on the Afghan peace process.105 On 29 February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed in Doha, Qatar, an agreement that appeared to pave the way for intra-Afghan peace talks despite its many challenges.106

Islamabad had a pivotal role in facilitating the peace deal,107 as shown by the presence of the Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi and Pakistan officials who attended the signing ceremony in Doha. Pakistan’s role as a facilitator of the peace deal was also acknowledged by Taliban’s deputy leader and chief negotiator on behalf of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.108 Pakistan supports a power-sharing arrangement involving the Taliban as functional to contribute to establishing a friendly government in Kabul.109 Islamabad also has to gain (e.g. military aid) from a scenario that leaves involved parties, the United States in particular, dependent on Islamabad for its enforcement.

Over the years, Pakistan’s link with the Taliban110 has become its greatest asset and has helped preserve bilateral relationships with Washington, not to mention US military and economic aid received.111 The role played in facilitating the peace deal with the Taliban allowed Islamabad to establish itself as a regional influencer, and analysts acknowledged that the US-Taliban deal had brought Pakistan diplomatic, financial and strategic dividends. It is worth stressing that Pakistan’s increasingly cordial link with the Taliban has been coupled by its struggle against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group generally known as the Pakistani Taliban. According to military sources, by 2018 the TTP, which had targeted Pakistan since the formation of the group in 2007, had been defeated by the multiple Army’s counter-insurgency campaigns carried out in the North West areas of the country.112 The militant outfit, however, appeared to have found a haven in Afghanistan and were in the process of reorganising in the South and North Waziristan districts of the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.113 Several TTP leaders have been killed in Afghanistan during operations of the Afghan and US military forces, allegedly in exchange for Pakistan’s supportive role in the Afghan peace process.114

9. Relationships between Pakistan and India

In February 2019, Indian and Pakistani warplanes crossed the Line of Control, the de-facto Pakistani-Indian border, and conducted airstrikes after a terrorist attack had hit a convoy of vehicles carrying Central Reserve Police Force security personnel in the Pulwama district of Kashmir.115 Since then, bilateral relationships between Pakistan and India remain tense.116 In 2020, countless violations of the ceasefire along the Line of Control were recorded, with casualties among civilians and soldiers.117

Pakistan has opposed the decision taken by New Delhi in August 2019 to revoke Kashmir’s special semi-autonomous status and to split the state into two Union Territories – Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. Pakistan considers Kashmir a disputed territory and has called for international intervention. Prime Minister Imran Khan has tried to internationalise the Kashmir issue by bringing it to the attention of international fora and condemning both the decisions taken by the Government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi118 and the actions of the Indian security forces in the state.

On 15 January 2020, the UN Security Council (UNSC) met and discussed the ongoing situation in Indian Jammu and Kashmir.119 The meeting was called with a different agenda, and the issue was brought in under the request of the representative of China. In August 2020, the UNSC discussed the topic again, but no statement was issued.120 Addressing the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 25 September 2020, Prime Minister Imran Khan called India’s Government a «sponsor of hatred and prejudice against Islam»121 and denounced New Delhi’s nationalistic ideology leading to alleged discriminatory policies, Islamophobia and repression in Indian-administered Kashmir.

The international community has not taken a defined position over the ongoing situation in Kashmir, and apart from concerns related to violations of human rights, appears to be inclined to espouse India’s position, namely that the issue must be settled bilaterally, through direct negotiation between Pakistan and India.122 Only China, Turkey and Iran have sided with Pakistan, criticising India’s move in Kashmir.

China has been observing the events in Kashmir with a level of concern. In particular, the disputed territory of Gilgit-Baltistan is geographically strategic in the context of the CPEC, and the Belt and Road Initiative at large123 as Chinese investment, which provides Beijing with access to the Indian Ocean, passes through this region. Against this backdrop, in November 2020, Prime Minister Imran Khan announced his Government’s decision to grant provincial status to Gilgit Baltistan, which will give the territory Pakistan’s constitutional rights and representation in the Pakistani Parliament.124 It is widely believed that Pakistan’s PTI government has acted under Chinese pressure in granting the status of the fifth province to Gilgit-Baltistan.125 The move upset New Delhi, which firmly rejected it reinforcing that Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, comprising Gilgit and Baltistan, are an integral part of its territory. While the vicissitudes of Gilgit Baltistan could be a response to India’s decision in August 2019 to revoke the special autonomy of India-controlled Kashmir, they have domestic implications. The decision to grant provincial status to Gilgit-Baltistan has been a longstanding demand of its population which the PTI Government embraced just before the local election which was then won in November 2020.126 The PTI formed a government in the semi-autonomous state after striking a deal with six independent candidates strengthening the federal Government against the protests of the opposition.

Turkey raised the issue of Kashmir at the UNGA in September 2019. Later, in February 2020, during an official visit to Pakistan, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated Turkish support to Islamabad on the Kashmir dispute. A joint Pakistan-Turkey declaration made a specific reference to Kashmir and called for settling the issue under UNSC resolutions.127 In September 2020, Erdogan spoke in support of the rights of the Kashmiri people during his address at the UNGA.128

Iran commented against India’s move over Kashmir, and Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Alavi Gorgani called on all Islamic Ummah to respond to this «major insult»129 while calling on India and Pakistan to establish a dedicated dialogue on the Himalayan region.130

Disputes over Kashmir have affected bilateral relationships between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which has maintained neutrality over the issue. Islamabad and Riyadh have a long-time partnership and economic and geostrategic ties, and Saudi Arabia has repeatedly come to Pakistan’s financial rescue.131 In 2019, Prime Minister Imran Khan did not attend the Kuala Lumpur Summit after Riyadh had not been invited. Instead, Malaysia invited Iran, Turkey, Qatar, and Pakistan.132 Yet, in August 2020, on the first anniversary of New Delhi’s revocation of the special status of territory to Kashmir, the long-time relationship of Islamabad and Riyadh was undermined by a comment of Pakistan Minister of Foreign Affairs Shah Mehmood Qureshi, who complained about the perceived lack of Saudi support in the Kashmir issue.133 Qureshi called for the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation – headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia – to convene a meeting on Kashmir.134 Otherwise, the Pakistani Minister proposed that Pakistan should call a meeting of the Islamic countries that support Islamabad on the issue of Kashmir, mentioning Riyadh’s rivals Iran, Turkey, Qatar and Malaysia where, earlier, in February 2020, during a visit, Imran Khan had insisted on the same issue.135 Shortly after, media reported that Pakistan was forced to repay US$ 1 billion of a US$ 3 billion loan it had received from Saudi Arabia in 2018.136

10. Conclusions

In 2020, the Government of Imran Khan has faced significant threats. Internal PTI strains and tensions inside the ruling alliance have weakened the political powerbase of the Prime Minister. Austerity measures, consequences of the July 2019 IMF EFF bailout programme, triggered higher inflation, unemployment and an increase in prices for primary commodities. Adverse economic impact on the masses caused discontent and scepticism about the PTI Government’s capabilities to deliver on its electoral pledges. Opposition parties joined forces and launched a campaign of mass protests determined to oust the Prime Minister.

COVID-19-related disruptions worsened the country’s precarious economic situation and challenged the PTI Government further. Khan’s performance deteriorated, and he was blamed for the lack of an effective response to the crisis. The military establishment came to Khan’s aid and took control of the Coronavirus outbreak but, in doing it, also appropriated the Government’s civilian prerogatives. This, in turn, fuelled further protests by the opposition.

Peace talks with the Taliban were an asset to Islamabad in light of the importance of Afghanistan as the nerve centre of political and economic developments in South Asia for both Washington and Beijing. Relationships between Pakistan and India were tense but stable. Pakistan failed in focusing international attention over Kashmir’s dispute; although, it could benefit from the support of China, Turkey and Iran. Saudi Arabia kept a neutral position on the issue, which undermined its relationships with Islamabad.

ISSN 2385-2526