Bangladesh’s parliamentary elections, held on 30 December 2018, saw Sheikh Hasina’s landslide victory. Hasina’s fourth term and third consecutive mandate was a sign of undisputable continuity. Throughout the year the government continued an intensive anticorruption campaign, started when the Awami League came back to power in 2009. As a result, at the beginning of 2018 the Bangladesh National Party’s leader and former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia along with a number of party members were jailed. The main opposition party was facing an unprecedented crisis, which did not necessarily depend on the government’s anticorruption activity. The economy continued to perform well and foreign policy took a more articulated shape, beyond a not always easy balance between India and China. The Rohingya emergency alleviated, as the refugees’ influx to Bangladesh significantly reduced, but hundreds of thousands of refugees were still living in camps and their future looked uncertain.

1. Introduction

At Bangladesh parliamentary elections held on 30 December 2018 Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League won a landslide victory. On the one hand, the arrest of the incumbent prime minister’s rival, Khaleda Zia, and of several other Bangladesh National Party (BNP) members silenced the opposition.[1] On the other hand, Bangladeshi voters apparently appreciated the government’s capacity to foster economic growth and guarantee security. The allegations of voting irregularities were not enough to explain the Awami League’s impressive victory, whose real reasons should be carefully analysed.

Sheikh Hasina aims to appear a secular leader and the champion of Bangladesh’s development and democratization. However, her government has used an iron fist against the opposition and adopted controversial measures aimed at discouraging political dissent. Rather than a democracy, Bangladesh under the Awami League’s rule appears to be a «hybrid regime», namely a state which, in spite of the existence of democratic structures such as elections, is fundamentally authoritarian. However, it is worth stressing that this kind of political system is increasingly catching on in Asia as the ideal formula to ensure political stability and economic development.[2]

Bangladesh’s economic growth is considered, indeed, as the effect of political stability and the main factor of the government’s broad consensus. As far as foreign policy is concerned, Bangladesh continued to carry out a regional policy in balance between its two powerful neighbours, India and China.

The Rohingya crisis, sparked in 2017,[3] received much less attention from domestic and international media, but, although alleviated in 2018, still persisted. Whereas the refugees’ influx diminished, an estimated 693,000 Rohingya were still in Bangladesh in April 2018[4] and only a few of them accepted the proposal of a safe return to Myanmar at the end of the year.[5]

2. The government’s iron fist against the BNP

In 2018 the BNP faced the worst leadership crisis in its history. On 2 January 2018 the court ordered Khaleda Zia’s arrest as the instigator of the bomb attack on a bus that killed eight people during anti-government protests in Comilla in 2015.[6]

Just the day before, the prosecutors demanded the death sentence for Zia’s son and BNP leader Tarique Rahman,[7] who lives in exile in London, and for four other people for their alleged involvement in cases of murder and bomb attacks. Rahman is also accused of masterminding an attack in 2004, when ten grenades were thrown on a peaceful rally organised by the Awami League, then in opposition.[8]

Khaleda Zia is facing several charges in different courts for stirring up the protracted violent protests of 2015, where 125 people were killed, and for publicly expressing doubts regarding the casualty figures of the 1971 Liberation War against Pakistan.

The former prime minister and her son were also facing several charges of graft.[9] On 8 February 2018 Khaleda Zia was sentenced to five years imprisonment charged with embezzling about Tk 21 million (approximately US$ 252,000). The sum came from foreign donations intended for a charity named after Ziaur Rahman, Bangladesh’s former president and Khaleda’s husband, and it was supposed to be employed to finance an orphanage. The crime was committed under Khaleda Zia’s tenure as prime minister, between 2001 and 2006.[10]

This sentence was considered politically motivated, aimed at preventing Khaled Zia from challenging Sheikh Hasina in the elections and at silencing the BNP.[11] However the case was filed by the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in 2008, when the nonelected nonpartisan caretaker government – whose members neither represented any political party, nor were allowed to contest the elections – was in power, tasked with preparing that year’s elections. It is also worth noting that the case took ten years to close.[12]

Apparently, the Zia Orphanage Trust case was just the tip of the iceberg, since the sum for which Khaleda and her son had been convicted was only a small part of the suspected wealth accumulated by Khaleda Zia’s eldest son, often from invisible income sources, during the two decades of his mother’s political engagement.[13]

Corruption is a rampant problem in Bangladesh and the Zia Orphanage case was the occasion for the government to demonstrate to the country that it was taking the problem seriously and putting in practice the principle «equal justice for all»,[14] irrespective of political affiliation or social position. Of course, in doing this, the Sheikh Hasina-led government was also able to thwart the opposition. In fact, under Bangladesh’s Constitution anyone jailed for more than two years cannot contest an election for five years.[15] This conveniently excluded Khaleda Zia from the 2018 election. The BNP then considered boycotting the vote, as it did in 2014.[16]

After rejecting the decision of the lower court to free Khaleda Zia on bail for four months on 19 March 2018, in May the Supreme Court reconsidered this response, after Zia’s lawyers requested her release for health reasons.[17] This decision was a wise compromise with the opposition, since it could open the door to the BNP’s participation in the elections.[18] In fact, had the BNP boycotted the general election for the second time, its registration with the Election Commission would have been cancelled, preventing it from contesting any further parliamentary polls.[19] The ruling party was concerned about another boycott, which could have taken the country back to the 2013 unrest and affected its stability, with great damage to Bangladesh’s economy.[20]

3. The 2018 parliamentary elections

The 11th parliamentary elections were held as scheduled before the end of 2018 and took place on 30 December, in spite of Khaleda Zia’s objections and the BNP’s attempts to postpone the date.[21]

The coalition led by the ruling Awami League obtained 96% of the vote and 288 of the 298 seats of Bangladesh’s one chamber parliament.[22] Voter turnout was 80%.[23]

The date of the polls was announced only on 8 November. Initially it was scheduled for 23 December, but on 12 November it was postponed to 30 December.[24] The opposition demanded to defer the polls by a month and wanted a caretaker government to administer the election process, but the government refused any postponement and rejected the request of a caretaker government as unconstitutional.[25]

Before the election, the Awami League formed a coalition, the Grand Alliance, which included 14 parties with liberal democratic and leftist leanings, some of them belonging to liberal political Islam[26] and others with liberal-democratic and republican leanings. A number of hard-core leftist parties[27] (including the Communist Party of Bangladesh), the Trinamool BNP,[28] founded in November 2018 by a group of BNP’s dissidents, and the Jatiya Party of former military dictator Hussain Muhammad Ershad joined this heterogeneous coalition as well.[29] Paradoxically, the Jatiya Party joined the Awami League’s camp, although it was in opposition in the parliament.[30]

The BNP participated in the election with a coalition of 20 parties.[31] It included the United National Alliance (UNA) and the Jatiya Oikya Prokriya, or Jatiya Oikya Front (National Unity Front). Rather than proper parties, they were blocks of parties or conglomerate parties, formed by 58 and 20 bodies respectively.[32]

The Jamaat-e-Islami, the BNP’s historical ally, did not contest the elections, since its status as a political party was revoked in 2013.[33]

From the ideological point of view, there was no meaningful difference between the two camps: the BNP-led coalition was certainly more conservative, since it included Islamic radical parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Khelafat Majlish and the Jamiyate Ulamaye Islam, that advocated the Islamisation of the state. But the same coalition included also parties like the Krishak Sramik Janata League (Peasants’ and Workers’ People’s League), presided by Kader Siddique, who fought the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971 as a militant of the Mukti Bahini, the guerrilla freedom fighters.[34]

To give an example of the contradictions of the Bangladeshi political scene, the Jatiya Oikya Front was formed by four main parties: the Gono Forum (also spelled Gano Forum), which originated from a split of the Awami League;[35] the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), with socialist ideals; the already-mentioned Krishak Sramik Janata League; the Nagorik Oikya, founded in 2012 by Mahmudur Rahman Manna, former organizer secretary of the Awami League.[36]

The Jatiya Oikya Front and the Gono Forum were founded by Kamal Hossain (aged 82). One of the nation’s founding fathers and a member of the Bangladesh Constituent Assembly, he was considered the champion of secular democracy in Bangladesh.[37]

The Khelafat Majlish, for instance, in 2006 allied with the Awami League[38]. Paradoxically, now these parties sit on opposite sides in the parliament.

The political situation in Bangladesh has traditionally been contradictory and fluctuating, with parties shifting very easily from one camp to the other. As already pointed out, most leaders of the main parties now allied with the BNP in the past have been linked to the Awami League.

Titled «Bangladesh on march towards poverty», the 2018 electoral manifesto of the Awami League was based on the party’s declaration at the national conference in 2016; «building a developed and digital Bangladesh» was its vision. Development was indeed the key subject of the Awami League electoral campaign: building up the blue economy, developing information and technology, fostering youth education and fighting malnutrition were its key objectives. The party pledged to carry out mega infrastructural projects, develop energy and mineral sectors, and improve youth employment. Freedom from poverty, terrorism, political extremism and corruption were its long term goals. More concretely, the party promised to create jobs for 10 million youths, to increase the GDP rate of growth from 7.8% to 10%, to bring the poverty rate from 22% to zero by 2041, to take measures to protect the minorities and formulate a media friendly law, aimed at preventing the misuse of information and promoting a journalism «loyal to social liabilities».[39]

The BNP’s electoral manifesto focused on politics, justice, development and social equality. Strengthening democracy, protecting freedom of speech and expression and ensuring the independence of the judiciary were the key issues, but there was no reference to the economy. The party promised to scrap what it defined «the black laws», like the Digital Security Act, the Special Powers Act and the Official Secrets Act. Unfortunately, the BNP had already made the promise to scrap the Special Powers Act in 2001 and, when it was in power, did not maintain its promise.[40] The BNP pledged to stop extrajudicial killings, a practice that began under its government, in 2001-2006. It also promised freedom of speech, expression and information, although it was the BNP government which enacted the Information Technology Act in 2006, containing a clause that seriously compromised the freedom of information.[41]

The pre-electoral period was very tense: since the announcement of the ballot, on 8 November and up to the election day, the official death toll was 21. Activists of both sides complained of attacks on supporters and candidates. Only in the capital the voting was largely peaceful, due to the massive deployment of security.[42]

Violence marred the election day, when at least 17 people were killed in clashes between the police, BNP’s and Awami League’s supporters, in spite of tight security measures and 600,000 troops deployed across the country.[43]

When the results of the elections were declared, controversy broke out. The opposition accused the ruling party of vote rigging, reporting stuffed ballots and intimidations in 221 of 300 polling stations. The BNP branded the polls as «farcical» and urged the Election Commission to void the re- sults. Khaleda Zia announced that the five elected BNP members would not take the oath.[44] On the other side, though the polls were still not closed the opposition declared it would reject the results of the elections.[45]

In spite of the opposition’s claims, the Election Commission reported only a few allegations of irregularities.[46] Hasina denied the allegations, defining the election «totally free and independent» and rejected the call for a fresh vote, requested by the opposition.[47]

The 71 year old Sheikh Hasina secured a record fourth term and third consecutive mandate, ushering in a new phase of stability.

The elected members of parliament were sworn in on 3 January, while Prime Minister Hasina was expected to form the new cabinet by 10 January 2019.[48]

4. The reasons of the Awami League’s success and the BNP’s crisis

Domestic and international media criticised the Awami League and Sheikh Hasina for being increasingly authoritarian and intolerant of dissent, for cracking down on the opposition with objectionable means and for human rights abuse. They labelled Bangladesh as a «one party democracy».[49] The prosecution of Khaleda Zia and her son was considered as the main cause of the BNP’s crisis and defeat.[50]

However, explaining the landslide election results in favour of the Awami League only as the result of vote-rigging, intimidation and repression would be simplistic. This is not to deny all these factors, but they alone are not enough to understand what was going on in Bangladesh. Similarly, explaining the BNP’s leadership crisis only on the basis of its chiefs’ troubles with the law is also simplistic.

Defining Bangladesh as a «one party democracy» is inappropriate: Bangladesh parliamentary politics are based on a multiparty system; the point is rather how parties form alliances.[51] The reasons of the Awami League’s success and the BNP’s failure lie with their respective capacity to attract political allies. From the pre-election dynamic it was clear that the Awami League’s formula, almost entirely based on the country’s development and economic growth, was much more attractive than the BNP’s. The Awami League proved to be more capable to represent the interests of Bangladeshi economic sectors. It is no coincidence, in fact, that three of Bangladesh’s biggest tycoons were connected to the Awami League. The first one, Syed Abul Hossain, has been a member of Bangladeshi parliament since 1991 and served as minister of the State Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives between 2009 and 2012.[52] Hossain is the founder of SAHCO International Ltd, a company that has worked since 1975 in infrastructural works, industrial and urban development, trading, construction, information technology and telecommunication, power, land and water management.[53]

The second tycoon, Salman Fazlur Rahman, is vice chairman of the Beximco Group (Bangladesh Export Import Company Limited). Founded in 1970, Beximco is the largest conglomerate in Bangladesh and one of the largest textile producers in Asia, listed on the London Stock Exchange. The brand has investments across a wide range of other fields, including marine food, construction, information and communication technology, hotel management and trading.[54] Rahman is also the president of the Association of Television Channel Owners (ATCO).[55] From 2009 to the present, Rahman has been serving as the private sector development affairs adviser to Awami League President and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina; this in spite of previous charges of corruption and fraud, in 1996 and 2007, which put him in jail for one year between 2007 and 2008, when he was granted bail.[56]

The third tycoon, Sajeeb Wazed, Harvard-educated son of Sheikh Hasina, is the president of the US-based Wazed Consulting Inc. and honorary, unpaid ICT prime minister’s adviser.[57]

The above are just examples of the strict connection between politics and business in Bangladesh. Over the years, patronage has replaced ideology as a means of building consensus.[58] Patron-client relations continue to be the «cornerstone»[59] of politics and society in Bangladesh, but they do not represent a mechanism to «further the interests of the party in power» anymore.[60] Rather, the opposite is true. Today, to take power the parties must further the interests of economic players. In recent years, the Awami League has been able to do that better than its rivals.

Besides these factors, there are other reasons of the BNP’s crisis, intrinsic to the party’s story. Patronage is the main cause of the BNP’s crisis, although it is endemic amongst all parties. The BNP became eager to grab state power and resources, which it succeeded in doing by building up an extensive patron-client network. However this was a process that could not but increase corruption, in its extreme forms: criminalisation and political violence.[61]

Tarique Rahman’s case is a typical example: he was prosecuted for political murder and is believed to be the most corrupt politician in Bangladesh, blamed also by his party fellows for being responsible for the BNP’s political disaster.[62]

According to the American Embassy in Dhaka

His [Tarique Rahman’s] theft of millions of dollars in public money has undermined political stability in this moderate Muslim-majority nation and subverted U.S. attempt to foster a stable democratic government, a key objective ìn this strategically important region. […] Embassy Dhaka has three key priorities for Bangladesh: democratisation, development, and denial of space for terrorists. Tarique’s audaciously corrupt activities jeopardize all three. […] In short, much of what is wrong in Bangladesh can be blamed on Tarique and his cronies.[63]

On the basis of these considerations, the American Embassy suggested suspending Tarique Rahman’s visa for the United States.[64]

In the year under review, BNP appeared to be in the midst of the worst crisis in its history, second only to the one caused by Ziaur Rahman’s assassination (30 May 1981), with its charismatic leader, Khaleda Zia, in jail and many of its senior leaders facing criminal charges. The acting chairman, Tarique Rahman, from his London exile, could not easily lead the party, which was left drifting.[65]

5. The economy

In 2017-2018 Bangladesh’s economy grew 7.86%, overcoming the provisional estimate of 7.65%. Industry grew 12.06%, the services 6.39% and agriculture 4.19%.[66] In 2018 Bangladesh’s GDP surpassed Pakistan’s and is likely to surpass India’s by 2020.67 Since Bangladesh’s economy started to rise in 2006, its GDP growth has exceeded Pakistan’s of about 2.5% per year, while Bangladesh’s population growth is 1.1% per year, compared to Pakistan’s 2.5%.[68]

Bangladesh’s poverty rate stands at 21.8% and extreme poverty at 11.3%, against 23.1% and 12.1% respectively, in 2017; the government is expecting to bring it to zero by 2030. Per capita income in 2018 was US$ 1,751.[69]

Today Bangladesh’s economy is among the fastest growing economies in the developing world, underpinned by strong domestic demand and structural transformation, aiming to create more and better jobs, boost private investment, diversify exports, build human capital, and create a business-friendly environment.[70]

In spite of the recovery in garment exports and remittances, the deficit has increased because of the rise in imports. Account and fiscal deficits are expected to increase, although the risks of external and public debt distress are low. Inflation is expected to accelerate due to the increase of global commodity prices.[71]

Commenting on the election results, most media connected Hasina’s victory to the country’s impressive economic growth, relating it to political stability, which they described as fruit of authoritarian and repressive methods.[72] Bangladesh’s economic rise is therefore generally considered as the most meaningful result of an authoritarian and stable political system.

However, a more likely cause of Bangladesh’s remarkable economic growth appears to be the progressive social policies carried out in recent years, namely education, of girls in particular, healthcare and female empowerment.[73]

At the moment of writing, Bangladesh’s integration in the global financial chain and supply markets is still limited; therefore the country does not appear to be totally immune from the effects of possible disruptive events, like negative financial market trends, increased trade protectionism, escalating geopolitical tensions, volatility in oil prices. These factors can have negative effects on global economic growth and, consequently, on Bangladesh’s export prospects.[74]

In order to reduce possible downward risks, the top policy priorities remain creating more and better jobs by enhancing private investment, building human capital, diversifying exports, improving financial and economic governance and enhancing infrastructural investment, especially in electricity supply, since energy efficiency is an essential condition for industrial growth.[75]

6. Foreign policy

As noted by the analyst Ishrat Hossain of the University of Oxford: «As the strategic rivalry between India and China intensifies, Bangladesh increasingly finds itself embroiled in a great game along the Indian Ocean».[76] The escalation of India-China rivalry in the region has made Bangladesh a key battleground and has shaped Narendra Modi’s foreign policy initiatives, like «Act East» and «Neighbourhood First».[77] Although the former is being labelled as the «old Look East wine put in a new bottle»,[78] it contains some innovations, introduced by the «Modi Doctrine».

The ambitious projects of the Indian prime minister aim to integrate South Asia with both Western Asia and Eastern Africa.[79] As the whole of South Asia is included in this frame, Bangladesh plays a key role in this geopolitical design.

The «Neighbourhood First» policy gives topmost priority to India’s relations with neighbouring countries. India is aware that if it does not improve its relations with its neighbours, it will pave the way to China’s growing influence in the region.[80]

Bangladesh’s relations with India warmed up when Sheikh Hasina came to power in 2009 and intensified after Narendra Modi’s rise in 2014.[81] Narendra Modi warmly welcomed Sheikh Hasina’s electoral victory.[82] In his message to the Bangladeshi prime minister, Modi reiterated the importance India attaches to Bangladesh as a close partner for regional cooperation and as the central pillar of India’s «Neighbourhood First» policy. However, in spite of bilateral cordial relations, the agreement on the sharing of the Teesta River waters is yet to be signed.[83]

In April 2018 the Bangladeshi prime minister visited India: the Indian government used this occasion to announce a new credit line of US$ 4.5 billion for Bangladesh and US$ 500 million for Bangladesh’s purchase of Indian defence hardware.[84]

Bangladesh plays a key role in India’s counterterrorism strategy.[85] The first joint training exercise at the transnational level under BIMSTEC-Milex 2018 took place in Pune (10-16 September 2018), with the participation of troops of all member states, except Nepal and Thailand, which sent observers.[86]

Bangladesh is also the gateway for India’s regional initiatives, namely the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).[87] At the 4th BIMSTEC summit, held in Kathmandu on 30 and 31 August 2018, a MoU was signed on the establishment of the BIMSTEC Grid Interconnection to enhance energy cooperation among the seven member states.[88]

From being the keystone of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in South Asia, recently Bangladesh has become the second largest importer of Chinese arms after Pakistan.[89] A huge contract for the supply of 23 Hogdu K-8W training aircraft to the Bangladesh Air Force was signed in Dhaka on 20 June. The amount of the deal was more than US$ 200 million.[90]

As far as the BRI is concerned, of the three planned mega projects, only the Payra coal power plant is under construction, while the Dhaka-Jessore railway and the Karnaphuli underwater tunnel are in the project phase.[91]

Bangladesh’s foreign policy has been evolving: its engagement goes beyond relations with the traditional partners (India, China, Japan, UK, US and Russia) and beyond its participation in the regional integration through SAARC, BIMSTEC, BBI, SASEC (South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation) and BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor). Recently Bangladesh has been looking at the European Union to increase economic ties, develop cooperation for democratisation programmes and enhance partnerships in areas of environment protection.[92]

Multilateralism within the UN system has remained the pillar of Bangladesh’s foreign policy.[93]

7. The aftermaths of the Rohingya crisis

Considering the tremendous impact of the Rohingya crisis on Bangladesh in 2017,[94] the aftermath of the crisis in 2018 cannot be glossed over. At the end of May 2018 the UN struck a deal with Myanmar, allowing hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to return to Myanmar safely and by choice. Conditional for the finalisation of the agreement had been the acceptance by Myanmar of the concession of citizenship and human rights for the refugees returning to Myanmar. However, the deal did not guarantee freedom of movement outside the Rakhine state. Refugees’ representatives and human rights organisations argued that the agreement still failed to ensure basic rights for the Rohingya.[95]

In October the UN overturned its decision, with the discovery that the genocide against the Rohingya was still ongoing in Myanmar, although Bangladesh and Myanmar had already agreed to start the repatriation process.[96]

Fortunately, the Bangladeshi government was totally committed to the principle of non-refoulement[97] and pledged to adhere to the principle of voluntary repatriation only. The result was that, in spite of the preparations by the Bangladeshi authorities for a safe return, no Rohingya refugee accepted to go back to Myanmar.[98]

1. ‘Bangladesh court orders arrest of Khalida Zia for arson attack’, Economic Times, 2 January 2018; ‘Khaleda Zia jailed for five years in corruption case’, Al Jazeera, 8 February 2008; ‘Ex-Bangladesh PM Khaleda Zia Gets 7 Years In Jail In Corruption Case’, NDTV, 29 October 2018; ‘Khaleda Zia sentenced to 7 years in another graft case’, Economic Times, 29 October 2018.

2. ‘Democracy decaying in Bangladesh’, East Asia Forum, 6 March 2018. See also Nisha Sharmeen Ali, ‘Bangladesh: Democracy Stumbles’, The Diplomat, 6 December 2013.

98. Anna Ellis-Petersen & Shaikh Azizur Rahman,‘Rohingyas to be repatriated despite UN genocide warning’.